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Since the 1920s and 1930s, the relationship of big business to the
'Third Reich' has been at the centre of successive attempts to explain
the nature of National Socialism and the National Socialist regime,
both the reasons for its establishment and the causes of its radical
expansionism. Furthermore, the behaviour of big business in wartime
in particular has come to symbolise the complicity of the German
economic and functional elite in the criminality of the Nazi regime.
The reasons for this ongoing debate are not hard to find, but they are
worth recapping none the less. The 'Third Reich' was established as
a direct consequence of the deepest crisis of western capitalism ever
known - the Depression; it was simultaneously a product of a deep-
seated crisis of liberal democracy, which witnessed a conservative
onslaught on the Republican project in Germany in which business
played a powerful and active role.' Big business was never fully
reconciled to the achievements of the 1918-19 revolution and, in the
period of intensifying distributional conflict which characterised the
post-inflationary period onwards, was one of the key interest groups
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pressing for a marginalisation of the Reichstag, for the dismantling of
the progressive welfare apparatus established by the Republic, and
for rearmament and a more overtly revisionist foreign policy,' After
1933 it profited hugely from the Nazi rearmament programme,
experiencing a rapid restoration of profitability, a huge expansion of
output, and consistently high levels of investment in the 1930s and
early 1940s. Big business was a key beneficiary of the brutal
destruction of the organised Left in 1933. The political emasculation
of the working class meant that wage levels remained low throughout
the 1930s, while the presence of massive state terror behind
management facilitated the accelerated adoption of production
techniques, management practices and productivity-oriented wage
systems which the workers, their scope for informal shop-floor
control also greatly limited by the events of 1933, could hardly
oppose.' The massive shift in power between capital and labour
which occurred in 1933, in short, had very real consequences for
how management behaved towards its workers on the factory level in
the 1930s.
Big business not only profited greatly from the production of
armaments to facilitate the regime's aggressive expansionism, it also
participated actively in the economic exploitation of annexed and
occupied territories between 1938 and 1944, acquiring or managing
plants under various forms of trusteeship all over occupied Europe.'
Labour and resources were not only exploited in the occupied
territories themselves, of course: raw materials were plundered and
capital stock was requisitioned for transfer back to the old Reich,
and, most of all, labour was forcibly deported to Germany. By 1944,
there were millions of foreign workers from all over Europe forced
to work in the factories of Germany's main war industries.' Up to
half of the workforce in some big companies was made up of such
workers, and most of these, especially those from Poland or the
Soviet Union, were forced to live and work under appalling
conditions. Furthermore, many businesses deployed concentration
camp inmates and Jewish slave labour at their sites in Germany and
abroad." Both on the actual production lines and in the establishment
of underground dispersal sites, where concentration camp inmates
were put to work digging out huge caves intended for the re-
establishment of production lines in underground facilities, industry
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co-operated with the SS in deploying thousands of people at a time
under conditions which condemned them to accelerated physical
decline - literally, these people were worked to death/ The
exploitation of prisoners of war, forced deported labour, and
concentration camp and Jewish slave labour all took place primarily
in the second half of the war, at precisely the same time that German
industrialists were playing a central role in the reorganisation of the
war economy under the armaments minister, Albert Speer.
After the war, of course, as the crimes of the 'Third Reich' came
to light, and as big business sought both to rehabilitate its reputation
and to defend itself against compensation claims from the former
forced workers, it was asserted that industry had been coerced into
participation in these barbarous practices and processes.' It must be
recognised, indeed, that business, like everybody else, did not have
complete room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis the regime, but one can still
dispense with a model of the relationship between industry and
politics founded on the complete coercion of the former by the latter
relatively easily. Industry was not forced to accept armaments
contracts against its will - it actively agitated for them; industry was
not forced to deploy foreign forced workers - it actively pressed the
authorities to deliver as many as possible; it was not even forced to
deploy concentration camp inmates - some companies, such as Opel,
exploited the limited room for manoeuvre available to them by 1944
to avoid doing SO.9
At the same time, however, the shift in the balance of power
between capital and labour which occurred in 1933 should not lead
one to over-hasty and simplistic conclusions regarding the nature of
the relationship between business and politics between 1933 and
1945; in particular, the partial community of interest that
characterised relations between industry and the regime should not
be taken as underpinning in any sense the notion that the regime was
a creation of big business itself, and one needs to maintain the
distinction between relationships that are founded upon partial
identities of interest and those that are, at the end of the day,
instrumentalist. Economic motives did, undoubtedly, play a role in
the formulation of Nazi foreign policy; specific campaigns in the war
were often motivated by the desire to acquire control over territory
rich in raw materials or oil, for example. But one should not conflate
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the idea that economic motives informed the regime's policy
decisions to a greater or lesser degree at various junctures with the
argument that policy was orchestrated by, and primarily in the
interests of, economic interest groups (that is, business itself). Neither
in the short- nor in the long-term was Nazi expansionism driven
primarily by the agendas of big business or the dynamism of German
capitalism. Rather one should remember the primacy of ideology as
the motive force behind Nazi expansionism and Nazi barbarism,
which leads one to the main problem with Marxist and Marxisant
theories of fascism - how does one accommodate Nazi racial policy
into any model of the relationship between capitalism and fascism?
While big business was more than willing to participate in the so-
called aryanisation programme (the expropriation of Jewish
businesses), it was here, as elsewhere, participating in the
implementation of policies formulated more or less autonomously by
the regime, for ideological reasons." In other words, the key question
to be answered is not one of who controlled who, but of the nature
of business collusion in the implementation of essentially
autonomously formulated policy.II
An examination of Daimler-Benz AG, the predecessor of today's
Mercedes-Benz AG, offers the possibility of using one particular firm
to shed light on the possible nature and motives of business
behaviour in the 'Third Reich'." Daimler-Benz can be taken as
paradigmatic, both insofar as it was a typical armaments
manufacturer in the 'Third Reich' itself, and insofar as its longer-term
history is fairly representative of the development of German
industry in the first half of the twentieth century as a whole. Formed
in the context of a stagnant economy and chronic over-capacity in the
mid 1920s through the fusion of the Daimler Motor Company,
Stuttgart, and Benz and Cie., Mannheim, it teetered on the brink of
collapse during the Depression, its turnover halving between 1929
and 1932, by which point its factories were working at only a quarter
of their full capacity," During the Nazi period, it experienced a rapid,
rearmament-driven recovery and made huge profits until the latter
phase of the war. Despite bomb damage, the core of the company
remained fundamentally intact in 1945 and, once a functioning
economy had reconstituted itself and the currency been reformed, it
expanded business rapidly again during the boom of the 1950s and
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1960s. Indeed, as a company at the centre of one of the most
dynamic industries upon which the so-called economic miracle was
based, it itself played a key role in driving the post-war boom.
The development of this company during the 'Third Reich' can be
discussed in terms of three main phases. First, the period 1933-36
can be characterised as the period of economic recovery, initial
rearmament, and essentially harmonious relations between the
company and the regime; second, the period 1936-41 can be defined
as a period of accelerated transition to armaments-based production
against the background of diplomatic and, after 1939, military
successes, and simultaneously as a period of growing nervousness on
the part of the company, as the regime's growing dirigism
undermined the autonomy of managerial decision-making at a time
when the company was being forced further and further away from
its core commercial and consumer production; finally, a distinct
phase is discernible in the period from 1942 onwards, the period
from the key turning point in the war - the failure of the initial attack
on the Soviet Union - to the collapse, a period in which the huge
increases in armaments output achieved by German industry under
Albert Speer could not prevent successive military reverses, and in
which the long war of attrition was followed by the final collapse of
Germany's position in the summer of 1944, heralding the imminent
end of the 'Third Reich'.
The complexity of the interface and interaction between business
and politics in the 'Third Reich' is such that, while it is both
legitimate and necessary to conceive of the firm as a single historical
actor (not to do so would be to obscure the essentially capitalist
rationale which governed business behaviour, including its co-
operation with the murderous racist practices of the regime between
1933 and 1945) the problems associated with doing so need to be
addressed. Both the minutes of the internal company board meetings
and the unified face presented to the outside world exaggerate the
internal cohesion of the company board and the coherence of policy
formation. As with any company, there were internal divisions of
opinion and agenda. Within the board, the existence of three broad
positions is discernible, whose relative weight shifted as the regime
and its policies evolved.
First, there were convinced, if not fanatical, Nazis who saw the
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opportunities offered by the regime as a chance to pursue a massive
programme of armaments-orientated expansion both in Germany
and in occupied Europe. Second, there were figures of more
conservative nationalist persuasion, whose patrician instincts
facilitated collaboration with authoritarian forms of rule, who
certainly did not reject the regime in any sense and who were not
above publicly adopting Nazi racism if it might benefit the company,
but who none the less took a somewhat more cautious view of the
firm's interests and prospects (Wilhelm Kissel, chairman of the
company board from 1926 to 1942 is a case in point here.) Finally,
there were also figures who can be seen more as hard-headed
technocrats. This generation of technocratic managers came to the
fore in the middle of the war - embodied in the replacement of Kissel
as chairman in 1942 by the much younger Wilhelm Haspel - and it
was precisely this generation that presided over the brutal
exploitation of forced workers and concentration camp inmates, a
fact which itself tells us much about the hard-headed pragmatic
pursuit of company self-interest which led to its collusion in Nazi
barbarism. However, it would be equally easy to overstate these
divisions, and easy to lose sight of the fact that this was a company
whose managers operated collectively and on the basis of interests
which were essentially corporate; for all the irrationality which crept
into business behaviour towards the end of the war, one must retain
still some sense of the company as an animal governed by rational
profit-seeking.
The satisfaction of this profit-seeking imperative was at the heart
of cementing the relationship between Daimler-Benz and the regime
in the first period, 1933-36, the period of economic recovery and
initial rearmament. Stimulated by the regime's tax relief measures and
aided by the announcement of the regime's Autobahn programme,
which sent a clear signal that the automobile would be at the centre of
future transport policy, the automobile industry, which had been
experiencing signs of an upturn in the autumn of 1932, experienced a
huge further expansion of demand and production." At Daimler-
Benz, car production more or less trebled between 1933 and 1935, as
did lorry production, and indeed, overall turnover. The work force
rose fourfold in the same period, and by 1936 all of the company's
plants had long since been working at full capacity.15
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The company did not owe its miraculous recovery solely to sales
of cars and lorries on the commercial and consumer goods markets,
however. From 1933 onwards, the company was a major participant
in the regime's rearmament programme. It had already had
experience of armaments production in the First World War, and
from 1925-26 onwards had participated in the secret rearmament
programme of the Reichstoehr:" In 1933, it moved to strengthen its
already close contacts with the military authorities by establishing a
new office in Berlin specifically aimed at acquiring military contracts,
recognising the likely importance of growing public contacts in the
near future as rearmament gathered pace." It also made a great show
of breaking off links with Jewish businesses, and ceasing to engage
the services of Jewish lawyers, to stress its ideological conformity and
political reliability to the regime." This was indeed a company which
identified itself in public very closely with the regime, stressing its
nature as a traditional, high-quality, German engineering concern,
and not hesitating to play on the American ownership of Opel, for
example, to gain competitive advantage over the latter when
contending for government contracts. Wilhelm Kissel, the chairman
of the company in the 1930s, was not above mobilising the
combination of anti-capitalist, anti-internationalist and anti-Semitic
sentiments of his audience within the regime when he compared
Daimler-Benz as a traditional German company to the 'Jew-tainted'
(judisch versippt) Opel; the irony here is in that in the middle of the
war, when Speer was trying to make the war economy more efficient
by forcing all producers to construct the model of the most efficient
manufacturer, the traditional, German, Daimler-Benz was forced to
produce the more efficient lorry of the supposedly 'Jew-tainted' Opel
under licence." Upon hearing this news Kissel committed suicide."
Not only did it gain armaments contracts for all its four main
plants in the Stuttgart-Mannheim area, it also reopened a plant in
Berlin which had been mothballed during the Depression, in
anticipation of armaments contracts. This developed into a major
tank, armoured vehicle and aero-engine producing facility producing
exclusively for the military. In addition, it established a brand new
aero-engine factory just outside Berlin, planned as early as 1934,
which by 1939 had become one of the biggest aero-engine factories
in Germany." The significance of armaments production for Daimler-
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Benz's recovery in the 1930s is underlined by the fact that whereas in
1933 the proportion of the company's turnover accounted for by
armaments contracts was roughly 25 per cent, by 1936 it had already
risen to 50 per cent (by 1939, it had reached 65 per cent)."
Unsurprisingly, the company was very pleased with these
developments; by 1936 its annual report stated that it had
experienced three years of unprecedented expansion and profitability
- as a direct result of the heroic policies of the Fuhrer - and was
looking to the future with great optimism."
In private, however, there was distinct unease beginning to creep
into the company management's attitude to the development of the
regime's policy by 1936-37, in a period which marks the transition
into the second phase defined above. During the years between 1936
and the outbreak of war, Daimler-Benz's profits and turnover
continued to expand, but by now significant numbers of industrialists
were having growing doubts about the increasing radicalisation of the
Nazi regime, and the impact forced rearmament was having on the
economy." Daimler-Benz's managers were among this group. There
were several causes of friction with the regime. Partly, the automobile
industry, a traditionally export-minded industry, was opposed to the
moves towards autarky embarked upon by the regime in 1936; an
element of the friction was due to the attempts by the regime to
introduce a forced type reduction and components standardisation
programme for the vehicle industry," This the industry regarded as
illegitimate dirigiste interventionism in the free decision-making
processes of private companies, and as unnecessarily disruptive to
production at a time when demand and output were at an all-time
high.
However, it is also very clear that senior managers at the company
were highly concerned at the impact rearmament was having on the
economy as a whole, and on the structure of the company and its
activities in particular." The management was wary of creating extra
capacity for armaments production at a time when raw materials
shortages were such that existing capacity could not be fully utilised
on some occasions. More importantly, considerations for the period
once the rearmament boom was over (as many industrialists assumed
it would be once Germany had achieved parity of armaments with
the West and reversed the Treaty of Versailles) meant that, the short-
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term lucrativeness of armaments production notwithstanding, the
company board was mindful of the need to avoid creating excess
capacity which it would be unable to utilise once armaments
contracts had tailed off. Hence, it was fearful of becoming over-
reliant on military production. The experience of the First World War
and its aftermath clearly played an important role here.
In the mid- and late-1930s, therefore, once the impact of the
Depression had been overcome and profitability restored, policy
oscillated between the idea of expansion to meet increasing demand
from the military agencies and caution at over-expanding in the firm
expectation that rearmament expenditure would be scaled down in
the near future. The company was caught in the dilemma of
observing growing diplomatic tension and the increasing likelihood
of war on the one hand, which would make armaments production
both unavoidable and lucrative, while wishing to avoid over-capacity
and over-reliance on military expenditure should the regime's
military expenditure recede on the other.
Significantly, the outbreak of war did not alleviate the uncertainty
which had characterised the board's strategy in the immediate post-
war years." In fact, the innate uncertainty of the war situation, which
affected Daimler-Benz especially in view of the proximity of its plants
to the French border, tended further to encourage a more cautious
attitude. The initial caution faded with Germany's military successes
of 1940, which reduced the immediate threat to the company's
capacity and caused a renewed wave of investment from the summer
of 1940 onwards. The military victories ushered in the prospect of a
Pan-European trading zone within the German-dominated 'New
Order', and the company's managers were keen to ensure that they
positioned themselves in such a way as to take advantage of this if it
occurred. Even here, however, it is clear that the expansion of
capacity embarked upon in 1940 was not undertaken without
substantial misgivings on the part of the board, and it should
certainly not be regarded as evidence that the company wished to
pursue a policy of expansion in the context created by the war itself.
This uncertainty was reinforced by the fact that for the first two
years of the war the company was operating on the assumption that
a return to peace time conditions and to competition in a consumer
market was imminent. In effect, the conflict between the short-term
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potential of armaments production and the need to retain a core of
consumer-orientated production lines which had characterised the
immediate pre-war period remained the dominant issue until autumn
1941. With the failure of Operation Barbarossa, immediate
considerations of post-war issues receded into the background for a
while; however, they re-emerged in 1943, with the military reversals
at Stalingrad and Kursk. The main point to emphasise when
considering the company's actions in the war - and this holds true for
both expansion of capacity at existing plants and the takeover of
plants in the occupied territories - is that an expansion of the
company's activities within the context of the war economy was not
necessarily the product of a long-term expansionist agenda, and is to
be understood in terms of the nature of the conflict between private
producers within the context of the war economy itself. The decision
to expand a plant or to take control of another factory was, as often
as not, more the product of the need to defend positions against
other companies and to prevent other companies from stepping in to
fill the gap." In a context in which demand was assured and the
market was, in effect, limitless, competition was for raw materials,
not for market share. Ensuring the supply of raw materials meant
presenting oneself as the main producer in any particular sphere,
hence the competition for control of capacity. Yet, within the context
of the war economy, the fact that individual companies were
competing for control of various areas of production and seeking to
frustrate their competitors' interests does not mean they were
pursuing an expansionist agenda going beyond the war itself."
To summarise, between 1936 and 1941 Daimler-Benz continued
to expand production and profits against the background of
continuous diplomatic and military successes. Yet, short-term profit
notwithstanding, it was increasingly concerned about the long-term
ramifications of this, and was acting increasingly with the motive of
defending company interests within a context shaped by
ideologically-driven policy which the company regarded with
ambivalent unease. Undoubtedly, the continuously expanding profits
sugared the pill and militated against any serious opposition to the
regime emerging from the business sector.
Recognising the extent to which company behaviour was
motivated by defensive pursuit or protection of its interests, in a
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situation which it increasingly wished it was not in, provides the key
to understanding the phase in which the complicity of the company
in the criminality of the regime reached its high point: the period
following the reversals of the winter of 1941-42 on the eastern front.
From this time onwards, as German industrialists were fully aware,
the war was likely to be lost and, soon after, Daimler-Benz in
particular was planning actively for a resumption of peacetime
production, albeit under conditions which made it impossible to
predict precisely how the post-war scenario would look. It was
precisely during this period that German industry, and Daimler-Benz
also, embarked upon its brutal exploitation of prisoners of war,
forced foreign workers, concentration camp inmates and Jewish slave
labour in their tens of thousands, under the most appallingly
inhumane conditions imaginable in some cases, thereby facilitating
the establishment of the Nazi racial hierarchy within the workplace.
Prisoners of war and foreign workers, primarily from western
Europe, had been put to work in Daimler-Benz's factories in
relatively small numbers from as early as 1940.30 As the supply of
additional German female labour dried up, the recruitment of foreign
workers had become the central element of Daimler-Benz's attempts
to procure additional labour by 1941, and the process of organising
their deployment and their integration had become correspondingly
'normalised'. The processes by which these workers came to Daimler-
Benz are often difficult to trace; the relationship between the
company and the labour authorities is difficult to reconstruct. While
companies were required formally to request supplies of foreign
labourers through official channels, in practice, even after the
regulation of the recruitment of foreign workers, companies such as
Daimler-Benz were able to continue operating simultaneously both
informal and formal channels to recruit labour." The processes by
which foreign workers came to Daimler-Benz are illustrative of how,
despite the existence of formal structures and procedures which
ostensibly had to be utilised, in practice policy evolved and interests
were pursued through a combination of personal and institutional
contacts between business and the regime, operating on various levels
and with various degrees of formality. The definition of the
institutional relationship between industry and the authorities
became blurred above all where industrial managers operated in an
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official or semi-official capacity within the structures created to
manage the war economy. Their function as co-opted bureaucrats
facilitated their collusion in the criminality of the regime; the
successive fusion of private and public functions simultaneously made
the boundaries between business and politics more fluid and gives the
lie to any attempt to construct a model of the relationship between
the two conceived in instrumentalist terms.
One should not underestimate the real hardship of western
European workers in the German war economy; for them, terror was
an important and very real part of the equation." None the less, the
majority of them were relatively skilled, which afforded them a degree
of respect and protection, and their relatively privileged place within
the Nazi racial hierarchy meant that the conditions under which they
worked were difficult but not punitive. The real break - and it was a
radical rupture - came with the massive influx of Soviet forced
workers into Daimler-Benz's factories in 1942: in this year, the work
force of Daimler-Benz was, almost literally, remade. Month on month,
up to 1,000 Russian forced workers arrived at Daimler-Benz's
factories, and it is clear that, even after the conditions under which
these workers were to be kept and put to work became obvious, the
company board was a willing recipient. Made to work under
conditions defined by the infamous 'Eastern worker decrees', the
suffering of these workers was immense." Initially, they were put to
work for 60 to 80 hours per week, with no proper rest period, and fed
on starvation rations which condemned them to malnutrition,
physical decline and disease, problems exacerbated intensely by the
absolute lack of sanitary facilities, proper clothing and so on." As the
appalling conditions under which they lived manifested themselves in
declining work-rates, marginal improvements to their conditions were
granted. However, while one should not understate the significance of
these improvements, meaning as they could the difference, literally,
between life and death for these labourers, the conditions under which
the Soviet workers lived remained dreadful; where the company did
attempt to improve the living and working conditions of these
workers, it was only to ensure the minimum standard of provision and
hygiene to prevent illness and disease from becoming rife.
The growing shortage of labour in the German war economy had
also led to a shift in the function of the SS-run concentration camps,
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and from 1942 onwards, they were used as sources of additional
labour for direct and indirect deployment in armaments production.
In 1943, and above all in 1944, concentration camp inmates were put
to work on the production lines of at least some of Daimler-Benz's
factories. Most notably, in September 1944, more than 1,000 inmates
from Dachau were put to work in lorry production at the company's
Mannheim plant, and more than 1,000 women from Ravensbriick
concentration camp were forced to work on the company's aero-
engine production lines at Genshagen near Berlin." The conditions
under which these inmates lived and worked were also indescribably
bad, their existence consisting of arbitrary brutality on the shop-floor
and constant SS terror; of malnutrition, cold and illness; and of long
hours of hard physical labour which were the cause of exhaustion
and long-term damage to health. Many did not survive.
Why, or how, did conventional industrialists, many of whom were
by no means Nazi supporters - indeed, the chairman of the company
from June 1942 onwards, Wilhelm Haspel, was himself harassed by
the Gestapo on account of his having a half-Jewish wife - allow
themselves to participate in all of this?
The causes, motives and explanations are complex. On the one
hand, the context in which it became possible emerged over a period
of time; on the other hand, much of what occurred can only be
explained - as far as the industrialists themselves are concerned, at
least - by thinking about the pressures facing men who operated
within the horizons created by the particular situation of the second
half of the war. The mental universe of the German managerial
classes in the first half of the twentieth century demands as much
consideration as imperatives implicit in the nature of managerial
capitalism per se." Their socialisation in the Wilhelmine era
undoubtedly predisposed them to collaboration with authoritarian
rather than pluralist modes of rule and facilitated their collusion in
the implementation of barbaric practices; the inheritance of an
authoritarian political culture was reinforced by a specific tradition of
paternalism in German company culture. Moreover, the fact that the
process of barbarisation was a creeping rather than overnight
phenomenon facilitated the transition to the situation as it stood in
1944: the terrorisation of German workers from 1933 onwards
paved the way for the harsh treatment of western European workers;
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the even harsher treatment of Soviet workers from the winter of
1941-42 onwards, and the normalisation of a culture of brutality
which two years of deploying the Soviet workers under appalling
conditions engendered, in turn facilitated the easy transition to the
deployment of concentration camp inmates under still worse
conditions. At no point was the conventional industrialist confronted
with a clear option of shifting from essentially decent to unspeakably
inhumane behaviour. The descent into barbarism was an ongoing
process.
None the less, underpinning the need to think of the company as
an historical actor, rather than about individual managers, there were
rational choices being made all the way down the line, rational
choices defined by the unspoken assumption that what mattered
above all was the survival of the company. Certainly, there was a
clearly visible capitalist rationale behind the behaviour of the
company towards its workers, forced and concentration camp
workers included, in the second half of the war. In one sense, of
course, the reverses of the winter of 1941-42 strengthened the
community of interest between business and the regime, insofar as
industry had no interest in Germany losing the war, and in the sense
that it was in industry's interests to co-operate in the mass
rationalisation programme of Albert Speer and in the implementation
of measures to increase armaments output radically, as indeed it did.
This, however, was very much a negative community of interest, and,
as it became clear that Germany was going to lose the war, industry
started to distance itself from the regime and consider the transition
to the post-war period." Quite when this happened is unclear.
Obviously it was a gradual process, but it seems that the Daimler-
Benz board was sceptical about the prospects for victory in the
summer of 1942, and by mid-1943 it was actively planning for the
post-war period."
Recognition that the war was lost had important repercussions for
the key issue of investment strategy - companies clearly had little
interest in investing in huge military production lines if they were
going to be of little use in anything other than the short term. The
reorientation towards peacetime was indeed marked by a clear
decline in investment as companies opted for a strategy of keeping
their assets liquid to finance post-war conversion and the clearing of
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bomb damage." This is where the company's rational interest in
intensifying the exploitation of forced labour is apparent. In one
sense, of course, the company had no option to do otherwise, but in
another, the existence of a helpless, unprotected, terrorised labour
force offered the company the perfect opportunity to compensate for
its unwillingness to invest by radically intensifying the work rate on
the shop floor. In the summer of 1944, as a virtual internal bar came
into force on new orders for machinery, Haspel demanded 'that the
last ounce be squeezed out of people'.40 The second half of the war,
and especially the period from 1943 onwards, witnessed an
increasing tendency to substitute labour for capital, allowing the
company to increase output while not damaging its prospects for the
post-war period. It was not ideological commitment, but the
autonomous pursuit of company interest which actively intensified
the suffering of forced labour in the second half of the war.
As the war drew to its end, and as bombing began seriously to
disrupt production, survival, rather than short-term profitability,
became more and more the key issue. In a situation where the
cessation of production could lead, both figuratively and literally, to
the dissolution of a factory, as machinery, labour and materials were
being conscripted here, there and everywhere in a desperate attempt
to stave off defeat, keeping production going in some form was in
itself essential to survival; increasingly, and especially in the case of
the large-scale deployment of concentration camp labour from late
1944 onwards, what mattered was not maintaining a rational, in
itself profitable production process, so much as maintaining the
illusion of production; if one did not keep producing in some form
until the end of the war, under the chaotic circumstances prevailing,
one might not survive. The assertion that this labour was in itself not
directly profitable in a short-term, direct 'profit-and-loss' sense does
nothing to relativise the suffering of the victims or mitigate the
responsibility of the company; it does not in any way undermine the
point that the company was able to save its skin for the post-war
period largely at the expense of the health and often the lives of
thousands of victims of forced labour. The direct link between self-
rescue and barbaric physical exploitation was even stronger, of
course, in the use of slave labour to dig out about a dozen
underground sites to which Daimler-Benz's most important
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machinery was dispersed in the last eight months or so of the war. As
a result not least of the dispersal programme, Daimler-Benz survived
the war with its inventory largely intact."
In conclusion, although many managers as individuals undoubtedly
shared, on some level, the National Socialist vision of a German-
dominated Europe in which Daimler-Benz would play its part, and
although this company seems to have been particularly bad in allowing
a climate and culture of racism to permeate the activities of the
company at shop-floor level, it did not take ideological self-
identification with the regime to become complicit in barbaric practices
or acts. Daimler-Benz's concern was that of pragmatic defence of self-
interest in a situation whose development it was itself largely incapable
of influencing, and which was not necessarily compatible with its own
long-term or even mid-term interests. This pragmatism was not only
perfectly compatible with the racial barbarism of the National Socialist
regime; in an extreme situation, pragmatic defence of company self-
interest actually encouraged, indeed demanded this descent into
barbarism. The extreme erosion of moral norms that characterised the
development of the 'Third Reich' was such that the appalling suffering
of the victims was not, apparently, discussed once. The narrowness of
the technocratic manager's field of vision was such that the only thing
that seemed to matter was the interest of the company. Self-
identification with the company apparently took precedence over any
self-identification with the real suffering of human victims. In an
extreme situation, managerial capitalism revealed itself for what it
essentially is - utterly indifferent to human beings.
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